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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION: My name is 
Arnold E. Perl. I am a principal in the law firm of Young & Perl, P.C. and serve as 
its President. I appear before you today on behalf of a group of management attorneys 
calling itself "The Working Group." A previous presentation by The Working Group 
was made on January 19, 1994, and will not be restated here, other than The Working 
Group's consensus position developed on this issue of employee involvement: 
Electromation and its progeny have had a chilling effect on employers' 
willingness to initiate and/or continue employee participation committees, 
at the very time these committees have become widely recognized as a 
major means of improving productivity and enhancing product quality. 
Electromation must be clarified or changed to assure continued employee 
participation. 
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When the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations issued 
its fact finding report in May 1994, it concluded that "With respect to future legal 
policy, the major question is whether, and if so, how, the National Labor Relations Act 
should be revised or interpreted to permit nonunion firms to develop one or more of 
the array of employee participation plans that have been challenged under Section 
8(a)(2) of the Act. . . ."i/ The Commission stated that in the second stage of its 
proceedings, it would like to hear from interested parties on the best possible future 
direction which should be embarked upon by the Commission. 
We submit on behalf of "The Working Group," that the National Labor Relations 
Board must make a thorough reexamination of the legal standards surrounding Sections 
2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to resolve the current 
legal uncertainty regarding employee involvement and participation programs ("EPP"). 
Unless and until such a reexamination is made and the results known, it is premature 
to conclude that legislative reform is an appropriate or even a desirable approach to 
protect bona fide EPPs. 
To assist the Commission, we have developed three propositions that should be 
considered in the reexamination of this critical area of the law. First, those individuals 
serving on an EPP must act as representatives of a larger group of employees for the 
EPP to be a labor organization. Second, employee groups whose essential purpose is 
V Fact Finding Report, Commission On The Future of Worker-Management 
Relations (May 1994), pp. 56-57. 
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to address quality, efficiency or productivity do not constitute labor organizations under 
the Act even if they "touch" on terms and conditions of employment. Third, the 
NLRB should reexamine its test for "actual domination" within the meaning of Section 
8(a)(2) of the Act. 
These three propositions address the two cornerstones of any relevant inquiry into 
the subject: the Section 2(5) definition of labor organization and the provisions of 
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. Significantly, they reflect concepts over which the Board 
is either substantially divided or markedly silent. As such, each is appropriate for 
consideration by the Board at this important juncture.
 v 
We begin with the Section 2(5) definition of labor organization, because unless 
an EPP is deemed to be a labor organization, the provisions of Section 8(a)(2) do not 
apply. 
PROPOSITION 1: Actual and explicit "representation" must exist 
in order for any employee group to be deemed a "labor organization" 
under Section 2(5). 
A crucial issue left unresolved by Electromation r is whether members of an 
employee participation program must serve in a "representational" capacity for the EPP 
to constitute "labor organization" status under Section 2(5) of the NLRA. Had the 
Board adopted the view espoused by Member Devaney in his concurring opinion in 
Electromation, thousands of EPPs would not be in legal jeopardy today. As Harold 
Datz, Chief Counsel to then Board Member John Raudabaugh, wrote, following the 
2/ Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990 (1992). 
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Board's Electromation decision: 
If representation is a necessary element for labor organization status, it 
may be that many EPPs are not labor organizations. The term 
"representative" can be used in a democratic sense or in an agency sense. 
With respect to the former usage, if the employer appoints the members 
of the EPP (rather than having them selected by the employees), the EPP 
would not be the representative of the employees. With respect to the 
agency usage of the term "representative," the EPP may be a vehicle for 
the attainment of employer objectives, rather than an agent or advocate 
for employee interests. If so, it does not function as the representative 
of employees. Finally, a committee of all employees, i.e., a committee 
of the whole, is not a representative group. Rather, it is the whole group. 
Thus, it does not "represent" employees. 
In sum, if "representation" is a necessary element for labor organization 
status, the aforementioned EPPs would fall outside the statutory 
definition.1' v 
Mr. Datz, like Board Member Raudabaugh, concluded that he does not consider 
"representation" to constitute a necessary element for "labor organization" statusr 
However, Board Member Devaney stressed in his concurring opinion in Electromation 
that he, contrary to his colleagues, "would not be inclined to find that an employee 
group constituted a statutory labor organization unless the group acted as a 
representative of other employees."- Clearly, Board Member Devaney is correct in his 
view, and he is supported by the Board's own decision in General Foods Corp.-
3/ Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-2 (Feb. 17, 1993) (emphasis in original). 
*! 14 
5/ Electromation, 309 NLRB at 1002 (Devaney, M., concurring). 
6/ 231 NLRB 1232 (1977). 
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Indeed, former NLRB General Counsel Jerry Hunter's own Guideline Memorandum 
concerning Electromation, issued in April 1993, focused on General Foods: 
In General Foods, . . . the employer established teams of all employees in the 
bargaining unit, divided according to job assignments, assigned job rotations and 
scheduled overtime. Each team had meetings to discuss such topics as 
implementation of the compensation system and the objectives of each team or 
group of employees. The teams operated under the control of a supervisor. A 
psychologist was hired to improve internal communications among team group 
members and to build trust among the team members, and members discussed 
conditions of work, such as compensation, at their meetings. The Board adopted 
the Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions that the teams were not 
labor organizations, since the entire bargaining unit, viewed as a "committee as 
a whole," has never been accorded de facto labor organization status. [It does 
not] stand . . . in an agency relationship to a larger body on whose behalf it is 
called upon to act. When this relationship does not exist, all that can come into 
being is a staff meeting or the factory equivalent thereof.2' 
Significantly, prior to Electromation, it widely was believed that representation 
status was the sine qua non for labor organization status. For example, in Sears, 
Roebuck and Co.,- the Administrative Law Judge held that an employee committee 
that discussed matters related to work performance with the employer was not a 
statutory labor organization because the participants "did not represent their fellow 
employees."- Thus, in Sears, the company created a -"communications committee," 
consisting of one employee from ten different departments, for the purpose of resolving 
problems between different departments and discussing matters such as uniforms, tools, 
.7/ General Counsel's Guideline Memorandum Concerning Electromation, Inc. at 
7, 309 NLRB No. 163 (GC 93-4). 
8/ 274 NLRB 230 (1985). 
9/ Id. at 244. 
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and equipment. A rotating system was used so that each employee in each department 
would have an opportunity to participate in the meetings, and the employee members 
of the committee were paid by the company for the time they spent at the meetings. 
Although the committee discussed matters related to work performance that could 
have had a direct impact on working conditions, the Administrative Law Judge found 
that the committee was not a labor organization within the meaning of the NLRA 
since: 
[T]he communications committee was used as a management tool that was 
intended to increase company efficiency. The communications committee 
was not an employee representative or advocate. The committee did not 
deal with the Company on behalf of the employees. The employees on 
the committee were not selected by their fellow employees and they did 
not represent their fellow employees. All the employees, on a rotation 
basis, were to participate in meetings with management to give input in 
order to help solve management problems. I therefore find that the 
communications committee was not a labor organization within the 
meaning of the [NLRA] . . . * . 
Since, as the Commission previously reported,- the Board in Electromation 
authored four different opinions explaining their respective views about the relevant 
legal principles, it is appropriate for the new Board appointed since Electromation to 
reexamine these views and seek to arrive at a consensus opinion. This is a task which 
this Board is uniquely situated to undertake. Indeed, as evidenced by the foregoing 
decisions predating Electromation, the NLRA heretofore has been interpreted to exclude 
JO/ Id. (emphasis supplied). 
Y\J Fact Finding Report, Commission On The Future of Worker-Management 
Relations, p. 54. 
wmm*m<**"' 
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EPPs where no finding of "representative status" exists. Were the Board to return to 
this earlier interpretation, much of the legal uncertainty and concern relating to these a d v 
programs would disappear. 
Proposition 2; EPPs do not constitute a "labor organization" merely 
because they may "touch" on terms and conditions of employment 
where their essential purpose is product quality, workplace efficiency, 
or productivity. 
In Electwmation, the Board underscored that its decision was limited to the facts 
before it and that its findings "[were] not intended to suggest that employee committees 
formed under other circumstances for other purposes would necessarily be deemed 
"labor organizations."- As if to distance itself from EPPs that had their roots in 
quality, efficiency, etc., the Board in Electwmation emphasized that there was: 
12/ 309 NLRB at 990. 
j 3 / 309 NLRB at 997, n. 28. 
14/ 309 NLRB at 1004, n. 2. 
our 
cor 
exi 
EP 
soi 
SO( 
Fo 
a ' 
lal 
"no sound basis in this record to conclude that the purpose of the Action 
Committees was limited to achieving 'quality' or 'efficiency' or that they 
were designed to be a 'communication device' to promote generally the 
interests of quality or efficiency. We, therefore, do not reach the question £r' 
of whether any employer initiated programs that may exist for such 
"purposes . . . may constitute labor organizations under Sec. 2(5)."- m ' 
Similarly, in his separate concurrence, Member Oviatt added that "[n]ot in this case 
Ft 
. . . is the question of how to treat a situation where a legitimately established 
Ai 
committee, whose purpose is to improve productivity, recommends changes whose 
te implementation results in job loss."-
Page 8 
As a result of Electromalion and its progeny, The Working Group previously has 
advised this Commission that management attorneys face a predicament. As we watch 
our clients continue to move toward greater employee involvement activities, they 
continue to be exposed to legal jeopardy by virtue of the considerable uncertainty that 
exists as a result of the lack of clear definition under the NLRA. The notion that 
EPPs which deal essentially with issues relating to quality, efficiency, and productivity 
somehow could be deemed a labor organization needs to be dismissed by the Board 
sooner rather than later. The Board needs to reaffirm the holdings of General 
Foods11' and Sears}*' 
Thus, in General Foods, the Board adopted the holding of its ALJ that to prove 
a violation of Section 8(a)(2), the General Counsel must first establish Section 2(5) 
labor organization status by a preponderance of evidence that the employee involvement 
groups were "in their intendment or operation entities which existed to deal with 
management concerning labor relations on behalf of employees." General Foods Corp., 
231 NLRB at 1235 (emphasis supplied). Although there existed evidence that General 
Foods dealt with its employees concerning conditions of employment, the 
Administrative Law Judge found that such actions were "de minimis" and found the 
teams not to constitute labor organizations under Section 2(5). Id. 
Similarly, in Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21A NLRB 230, an Administrative Law 
15/ 231 NLRB 1232 (1971). 
16/ 274 NLRB 230 (1985). 
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Judge found that the communications committee discussed matters related to work 
performance which could have a direct impact on working conditions, but found the 
group not to be a "labor organization" since, inter alia, the evidence on the record 
"establishe[d] that the communication committee was used as a management tool that 
was intended to increase company efficiency." 
In his concurring opinion in Electromation, Member Oviatt stated that: 
I find nothing in today's decision that should be read as a condemnation 
of cooperative programs and committees of the type I have outlined 
above. The statute does not forbid direct communication between the 
employer and its employees to address and solve significant productivity 
and efficiency problems in the workplace.-
 v 
The time has come for the entire Board itself to provide such assurance. As 
noted by Charles B. Craver, Professor of Law and former Secretary of the Labor and 
Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association: 
. . . . NLRA provisions should be interpreted and applied in a flexible 
manner that will permit the development of innovative forms of worker 
participation, while simultaneously protecting the fundamental statutory 
right of employees to control their representational destiny.-
Such an appropriate balance can be attained when employee participation 
programs revolve around quality, efficiency, communications, and/or productivity. 
Surely they can and do coexist in the workplace without jeopardizing the employees' 
right to choose representation under the NLRA. Indeed, "genuine" employee 
17/ 309 NLRB at 1004. 
18/ Craver, "The NLRA at 50: From Youthful Exuberance to Middle-Aged 
Complacency," Lab. L.J. 615 (August 1985). 
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participation programs must be allowed to flourish free from legal challenge. This 
Administration's emphasis and reliance on employee involvement in the workplace 
requires nothing less. 
Proposition 3; The National Labor Relations Board should reexamine 
its test for "actual domination" under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. 
The Board has acknowledged that "[the NLRA] does not define the specific acts 
that may constitute domination . . . ."- In Eleciromation, however, the Board, for the 
first time, applied a definition that will cover most any employer conduct vis-a-vis a 
"labor organization": 
[A] labor organization that is the creation of management, 
whose structure and function are essentially determined by 
management, . . . and whose continued existence depends on 
the fiat of management, is one whose formation or 
administration has been dominated under Section 8(a)(2). In 
such an instance, actual domination has been established by 
virtue of the employer's specific acts of creating the 
organization itself and determining its structure and 
function.-
The view taken by the Board in Eleciromation would require that management 
essentially take a "hands-off approach to EPPs in order to avoid a finding of 
"domination." Yet this is directly contrary to that which is required for the successful 
implementation of EPPs, according to a study reported recently in the Harvard Business 
19/ 309 NLRB at 995. 
20/ Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Review.- The study, conducted by researchers at the University of Southern 
California's Center for Effective Organizations, found that a hands-off approach by 
managers "turns teamwork into a little more than a waste of everyone's time." Indeed, 
the key problem where teamwork failed, according to the study, "was the lack of 
management's involvement in creating a context where work could go forward."-
Yet, when management becomes "involved" under the Board's view, such involvement 
automatically will be construed as "domination." 
The Board's domination test, as articulated in Electromation, essentially is an 
objective test for "the potential to dominate" rather than a determination of "actual 
domination," especially since the subjective standpoint of the employees is not even 
considered. Such an approach appears to be contrary to the mainstream of authority 
developed by the circuits, which requires evidence of "actual domination" rather than 
merely a potential to dominate in order to establish a violation of Section 8(a)(2) of 
the Act. 
As the First Circuit observed in NLRB v. Northeastern University, 601 F.2d 1208 
(1st Cir. 1979): 
This collection of precedents, recognizing some room for management-
employee cooperation short of domination, looking to the subjective 
realities of domination of employee will and not just the objective 
potentialities of organizational structure seems also in harmony with the 
approach in other circuits (citations omitted). . . . If anything, changing 
21/ Harvard Business Review, May - June 1993, at 13. 
22/ Id. 
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conditions in the labor management field seemed to have strengthened the 
case for providing room for cooperative employer-employee arrangements 
as alternatives to the traditional adversarial model."-
The Board's test for domination not only appears to be contrary to the 
mainstream of authority developed by the circuits, it does not take into account or give 
effect to the National Productivity and Quality of Working Life Act which Congress 
passed in 1975, which underscores the importance of such cooperative efforts to 
improving the productivity of U.S. industry. The Act provides that the "laws, rules, 
regulations, and policies of the U.S. shall be interpreted as to give full force and effect 
to this policy."^ 
Significantly, a reexamination of the test for evaluating EPPs under Section 
8(a)(2) was advocated by Member Raudabaugh in his concurring opinion in 
Eleclrotnation. In his view, the test for evaluating EPPs under Section 8(a)(2) should 
turn on the following factors: 
(1) The extent of the employer's involvement in the structure and operation 
of the committees; 
(2) Whether the employees, from an objective standpoint, reasonably perceive 
the EPP as a substitute for full collective bargaining through a traditional 
union; 
23/ Id. at 1213-14 (citations omitted). 
24/ National Productivity and Quality of Work Like Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. 
§2401 et seg. 
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(3) Whether employees have been assured of their Section 7 right to choose 
to be represented by a traditional union under a system of full collective 
bargaining; and 
(4) The employer's motives in establishing the EPP.-
Similarly, in yet another test for evaluating EPPs under Section 8(a)(2), it has 
been proposed that an 8(a)(2) violation could be established only where a labor 
organization existed, some assistance was provided by the employer, and there existed 
either employer intent to coerce or a showing of employee dissatisfaction.-
It is noted that the test advocated by Member Raudabaugh as well as the test 
espoused by the Note in the Yale Law Journal would afford greater flexibility for bona 
fide EPPs and serve as "a scalpel for excising occasional malignancies," rather than "a 
meat cleaver once appropriate for hacking through the mass of company unions."-
CONCLUSION 
Exactly one year ago, while addressing the American Bar Association's Section 
of Labor and Employment Law at its 1993 Annual Meeting in New York, N.Y., I 
urged the new Board to expand on what the previous Board already had said in 
25/ 309 NLRB at 1013. 
26/ Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 
Yale L.J. 510, 516 (quoted with approval in NLRB v. Northeastern University, 601 F.2d 
1208 (1st Cir. 1979)). 
27/ 82 Yale L.J. at 528. 
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Electro/nation and DuPont.- I noted that Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, told a 
Senate committee on July 1, 1993, referring to the Board's decisions in Electromation 
and DuPont, that "more clarification of the issue is needed."- In fact, Secretary 
Reich stated that Electromation and DuPont may be "chilling very constructive worker-
management relations."- Secretary Reich further expressed concern that these 
decisions "have had a broader affect" on cooperative worker-management efforts than 
the "relatively narrow" specific facts involved.-
Consistent with the Secretary's view, this Commission can play a vital role. 
When the Commission issues its recommendations, it should identify the propositions 
discussed herein and urge the Board to select key cases in which these propositions can 
be addressed. Only by the adoption of these principles, can the Board return to its 
own precedent and conform to the mainstream of judicial authority. The result will 
be to eliminate the legal uncertainties now afflicting the adoption and implementation 
of these important mechanisms of competitiveness. 
* * * * * 
28/ E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 311 NLRB 893 (1993). 
29/ Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-6 (July 2, 1993). 
3 0 / I d 
31/ Id. 
